The high implied probability that no US ally will acquire nuclear weapons before 2027 reflects the lack of active weapons programs or imminent breakout timelines among candidates such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Recent US civil nuclear cooperation, including the 2026 123 agreement with Riyadh submitted for congressional review, centers on reactor construction and potential low-level enrichment for energy security rather than weapons development. Seoul and Tokyo have advanced discussions on domestic fuel-cycle rights and nuclear-powered submarines under NPT constraints and US oversight, while public support for independent deterrents remains high but governments continue to prioritize alliance extended deterrence and nonproliferation commitments. No verifiable tests, production decisions, or political authorizations point to capability acquisition within the remaining months of 2026.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於是
5% 機率
$212,871 交易量
$212,871 交易量
2026-12-31
是
5% 機率
$212,871 交易量
$212,871 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
The high implied probability that no US ally will acquire nuclear weapons before 2027 reflects the lack of active weapons programs or imminent breakout timelines among candidates such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Recent US civil nuclear cooperation, including the 2026 123 agreement with Riyadh submitted for congressional review, centers on reactor construction and potential low-level enrichment for energy security rather than weapons development. Seoul and Tokyo have advanced discussions on domestic fuel-cycle rights and nuclear-powered submarines under NPT constraints and US oversight, while public support for independent deterrents remains high but governments continue to prioritize alliance extended deterrence and nonproliferation commitments. No verifiable tests, production decisions, or political authorizations point to capability acquisition within the remaining months of 2026.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
市場開放時間： Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
交易量
$212,871結束日期
2027-01-01市場開放時間
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETThis market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
The high implied probability that no US ally will acquire nuclear weapons before 2027 reflects the lack of active weapons programs or imminent breakout timelines among candidates such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Recent US civil nuclear cooperation, including the 2026 123 agreement with Riyadh submitted for congressional review, centers on reactor construction and potential low-level enrichment for energy security rather than weapons development. Seoul and Tokyo have advanced discussions on domestic fuel-cycle rights and nuclear-powered submarines under NPT constraints and US oversight, while public support for independent deterrents remains high but governments continue to prioritize alliance extended deterrence and nonproliferation commitments. No verifiable tests, production decisions, or political authorizations point to capability acquisition within the remaining months of 2026.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
交易量
$212,871結束日期
2027-01-01市場開放時間
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETThe high implied probability that no US ally will acquire nuclear weapons before 2027 reflects the lack of active weapons programs or imminent breakout timelines among candidates such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Recent US civil nuclear cooperation, including the 2026 123 agreement with Riyadh submitted for congressional review, centers on reactor construction and potential low-level enrichment for energy security rather than weapons development. Seoul and Tokyo have advanced discussions on domestic fuel-cycle rights and nuclear-powered submarines under NPT constraints and US oversight, while public support for independent deterrents remains high but governments continue to prioritize alliance extended deterrence and nonproliferation commitments. No verifiable tests, production decisions, or political authorizations point to capability acquisition within the remaining months of 2026.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於
警惕外部連結哦。
警惕外部連結哦。
Frequently Asked Questions