**Traders assign a 94.5% probability to “No” because U.S.-brokered peace talks remain stalled over unresolved territorial issues, particularly Russian demands for full control of Donbas, with no formal bilateral security guarantee finalized despite earlier 2026 drafts.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv revived discussions of a ceasefire framework that could include U.S.-backed monitoring, European-led forces, and conditional long-term support, yet these talks produced no breakthrough and are slated for possible trilateral follow-up only in October. Ongoing U.S. arms approvals, such as the recent $2.7 billion air-defense package, and sanctions measures reflect continued engagement without crossing into the binding security commitments Ukraine seeks by year-end. Historical patterns of protracted negotiations and the requirement for congressional ratification plus mutual acceptance of territorial lines further reduce the chance of agreement before December 31.
สรุปจาก AI ทดลองที่อ้างอิงข้อมูลจาก Polymarket ไม่ใช่คำแนะนำในการเทรดและไม่มีผลต่อการตัดสินตลาดนี้ · อัปเดตแล้วU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
6% โอกาส
$38,727 ปริมาณ
$38,727 ปริมาณ
Dec 31, 2026
6% โอกาส
$38,727 ปริมาณ
$38,727 ปริมาณ
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders assign a 94.5% probability to “No” because U.S.-brokered peace talks remain stalled over unresolved territorial issues, particularly Russian demands for full control of Donbas, with no formal bilateral security guarantee finalized despite earlier 2026 drafts.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv revived discussions of a ceasefire framework that could include U.S.-backed monitoring, European-led forces, and conditional long-term support, yet these talks produced no breakthrough and are slated for possible trilateral follow-up only in October. Ongoing U.S. arms approvals, such as the recent $2.7 billion air-defense package, and sanctions measures reflect continued engagement without crossing into the binding security commitments Ukraine seeks by year-end. Historical patterns of protracted negotiations and the requirement for congressional ratification plus mutual acceptance of territorial lines further reduce the chance of agreement before December 31.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ: May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
ปริมาณการซื้อขาย
$38,727วันสิ้นสุด
Jan 1, 2027ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETผู้ตัดสินผล
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders assign a 94.5% probability to “No” because U.S.-brokered peace talks remain stalled over unresolved territorial issues, particularly Russian demands for full control of Donbas, with no formal bilateral security guarantee finalized despite earlier 2026 drafts.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv revived discussions of a ceasefire framework that could include U.S.-backed monitoring, European-led forces, and conditional long-term support, yet these talks produced no breakthrough and are slated for possible trilateral follow-up only in October. Ongoing U.S. arms approvals, such as the recent $2.7 billion air-defense package, and sanctions measures reflect continued engagement without crossing into the binding security commitments Ukraine seeks by year-end. Historical patterns of protracted negotiations and the requirement for congressional ratification plus mutual acceptance of territorial lines further reduce the chance of agreement before December 31.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
ปริมาณการซื้อขาย
$38,727วันสิ้นสุด
Jan 1, 2027ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETผู้ตัดสินผล
0x65070BE91...**Traders assign a 94.5% probability to “No” because U.S.-brokered peace talks remain stalled over unresolved territorial issues, particularly Russian demands for full control of Donbas, with no formal bilateral security guarantee finalized despite earlier 2026 drafts.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv revived discussions of a ceasefire framework that could include U.S.-backed monitoring, European-led forces, and conditional long-term support, yet these talks produced no breakthrough and are slated for possible trilateral follow-up only in October. Ongoing U.S. arms approvals, such as the recent $2.7 billion air-defense package, and sanctions measures reflect continued engagement without crossing into the binding security commitments Ukraine seeks by year-end. Historical patterns of protracted negotiations and the requirement for congressional ratification plus mutual acceptance of territorial lines further reduce the chance of agreement before December 31.
สรุปจาก AI ทดลองที่อ้างอิงข้อมูลจาก Polymarket ไม่ใช่คำแนะนำในการเทรดและไม่มีผลต่อการตัดสินตลาดนี้ · อัปเดตแล้ว
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