The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience through nearly seven months of conflict with the United States and Israel, including leadership succession after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death and the absence of major military defections, underpins the near-certain trader consensus against a fall by September 30. Recent developments, such as Iran's September conditions conveyed via Qatari mediators to end hostilities—including lifting naval blockades and releasing frozen assets—along with IRGC statements on long-term preparedness and President Masoud Pezeshkian's UN General Assembly travel, signal institutional continuity rather than collapse. Ongoing sanctions, economic strain, and domestic repression have not produced the coordinated elite fractures or nationwide mobilization needed for rapid change within days. While a sudden internal upheaval or unforeseen escalation could theoretically alter trajectories, the regime's adaptive security apparatus and lack of viable immediate alternatives make such an outcome by month-end highly improbable based on current evidence.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · AggiornatoSì
<1% probabilità
$2,420,054 Vol.
$2,420,054 Vol.
30 set 2026
Sì
<1% probabilità
$2,420,054 Vol.
$2,420,054 Vol.
30 set 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by September 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting. The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience through nearly seven months of conflict with the United States and Israel, including leadership succession after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death and the absence of major military defections, underpins the near-certain trader consensus against a fall by September 30. Recent developments, such as Iran's September conditions conveyed via Qatari mediators to end hostilities—including lifting naval blockades and releasing frozen assets—along with IRGC statements on long-term preparedness and President Masoud Pezeshkian's UN General Assembly travel, signal institutional continuity rather than collapse. Ongoing sanctions, economic strain, and domestic repression have not produced the coordinated elite fractures or nationwide mobilization needed for rapid change within days. While a sudden internal upheaval or unforeseen escalation could theoretically alter trajectories, the regime's adaptive security apparatus and lack of viable immediate alternatives make such an outcome by month-end highly improbable based on current evidence.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by September 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercato aperto: Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Volume
$2,420,054Data di fine
1 ott 2026Mercato aperto
Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ETRisolutore
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by September 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting. The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience through nearly seven months of conflict with the United States and Israel, including leadership succession after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death and the absence of major military defections, underpins the near-certain trader consensus against a fall by September 30. Recent developments, such as Iran's September conditions conveyed via Qatari mediators to end hostilities—including lifting naval blockades and releasing frozen assets—along with IRGC statements on long-term preparedness and President Masoud Pezeshkian's UN General Assembly travel, signal institutional continuity rather than collapse. Ongoing sanctions, economic strain, and domestic repression have not produced the coordinated elite fractures or nationwide mobilization needed for rapid change within days. While a sudden internal upheaval or unforeseen escalation could theoretically alter trajectories, the regime's adaptive security apparatus and lack of viable immediate alternatives make such an outcome by month-end highly improbable based on current evidence.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by September 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$2,420,054Data di fine
1 ott 2026Mercato aperto
Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ETRisolutore
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience through nearly seven months of conflict with the United States and Israel, including leadership succession after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death and the absence of major military defections, underpins the near-certain trader consensus against a fall by September 30. Recent developments, such as Iran's September conditions conveyed via Qatari mediators to end hostilities—including lifting naval blockades and releasing frozen assets—along with IRGC statements on long-term preparedness and President Masoud Pezeshkian's UN General Assembly travel, signal institutional continuity rather than collapse. Ongoing sanctions, economic strain, and domestic repression have not produced the coordinated elite fractures or nationwide mobilization needed for rapid change within days. While a sudden internal upheaval or unforeseen escalation could theoretically alter trajectories, the regime's adaptive security apparatus and lack of viable immediate alternatives make such an outcome by month-end highly improbable based on current evidence.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato
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