Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with extended US deterrence arrangements and extended technical timelines for fissile material production or weaponization, underpin the 95.7% implied probability that no qualifying US ally will possess a new nuclear weapon by the end of 2026. Eligible allies such as South Korea and Japan have seen public debates and polling on independent deterrents, yet policy remains anchored in alliance coordination, IAEA safeguards, and explicit rejections of near-term armament by senior officials. Recent US-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperation emphasizes power generation with enrichment caps that experts assess require decades to reach weapons-usable material under verification. Nuclear-powered submarine programs in South Korea explicitly bar weapons applications and target operational capability only in the mid-2030s. Scenarios that could still shift outcomes include an abrupt NPT withdrawal paired with rapid covert assembly or a verified transfer of operational control over existing US weapons, though both face substantial diplomatic, legal, and practical hurdles within the remaining months.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено4% шанс
$212,517 Обс.
$212,517 Обс.
Dec 31, 2026
4% шанс
$212,517 Обс.
$212,517 Обс.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with extended US deterrence arrangements and extended technical timelines for fissile material production or weaponization, underpin the 95.7% implied probability that no qualifying US ally will possess a new nuclear weapon by the end of 2026. Eligible allies such as South Korea and Japan have seen public debates and polling on independent deterrents, yet policy remains anchored in alliance coordination, IAEA safeguards, and explicit rejections of near-term armament by senior officials. Recent US-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperation emphasizes power generation with enrichment caps that experts assess require decades to reach weapons-usable material under verification. Nuclear-powered submarine programs in South Korea explicitly bar weapons applications and target operational capability only in the mid-2030s. Scenarios that could still shift outcomes include an abrupt NPT withdrawal paired with rapid covert assembly or a verified transfer of operational control over existing US weapons, though both face substantial diplomatic, legal, and practical hurdles within the remaining months.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Ринок відкрито: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Обсяг
$212,517Дата завершення
Jan 1, 2027Ринок відкрито
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETВирішувач
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with extended US deterrence arrangements and extended technical timelines for fissile material production or weaponization, underpin the 95.7% implied probability that no qualifying US ally will possess a new nuclear weapon by the end of 2026. Eligible allies such as South Korea and Japan have seen public debates and polling on independent deterrents, yet policy remains anchored in alliance coordination, IAEA safeguards, and explicit rejections of near-term armament by senior officials. Recent US-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperation emphasizes power generation with enrichment caps that experts assess require decades to reach weapons-usable material under verification. Nuclear-powered submarine programs in South Korea explicitly bar weapons applications and target operational capability only in the mid-2030s. Scenarios that could still shift outcomes include an abrupt NPT withdrawal paired with rapid covert assembly or a verified transfer of operational control over existing US weapons, though both face substantial diplomatic, legal, and practical hurdles within the remaining months.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Обсяг
$212,517Дата завершення
Jan 1, 2027Ринок відкрито
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETВирішувач
0x65070BE91...Strong nonproliferation commitments under the NPT, combined with extended US deterrence arrangements and extended technical timelines for fissile material production or weaponization, underpin the 95.7% implied probability that no qualifying US ally will possess a new nuclear weapon by the end of 2026. Eligible allies such as South Korea and Japan have seen public debates and polling on independent deterrents, yet policy remains anchored in alliance coordination, IAEA safeguards, and explicit rejections of near-term armament by senior officials. Recent US-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperation emphasizes power generation with enrichment caps that experts assess require decades to reach weapons-usable material under verification. Nuclear-powered submarine programs in South Korea explicitly bar weapons applications and target operational capability only in the mid-2030s. Scenarios that could still shift outcomes include an abrupt NPT withdrawal paired with rapid covert assembly or a verified transfer of operational control over existing US weapons, though both face substantial diplomatic, legal, and practical hurdles within the remaining months.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
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