Strict non-proliferation norms under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, combined with US extended deterrence commitments to allies such as NATO members, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, underpin the 95.7% trader consensus against any ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027. These arrangements provide security guarantees that reduce incentives for independent arsenals, while technical, diplomatic, and alliance pressures create substantial barriers to rapid development or deployment. No major policy shifts, treaty withdrawals, or verified programs have emerged in recent months to alter this baseline. Late developments such as an abrupt alliance rupture, secret program disclosure, or sudden regional escalation could still shift probabilities, though such paths face high institutional and international hurdles.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato4% probabilità
$212,517 Vol.
$212,517 Vol.
31 dic 2026
4% probabilità
$212,517 Vol.
$212,517 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Strict non-proliferation norms under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, combined with US extended deterrence commitments to allies such as NATO members, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, underpin the 95.7% trader consensus against any ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027. These arrangements provide security guarantees that reduce incentives for independent arsenals, while technical, diplomatic, and alliance pressures create substantial barriers to rapid development or deployment. No major policy shifts, treaty withdrawals, or verified programs have emerged in recent months to alter this baseline. Late developments such as an abrupt alliance rupture, secret program disclosure, or sudden regional escalation could still shift probabilities, though such paths face high institutional and international hurdles.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Mercato aperto: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volume
$212,517Data di fine
1 gen 2027Mercato aperto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETRisolutore
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Strict non-proliferation norms under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, combined with US extended deterrence commitments to allies such as NATO members, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, underpin the 95.7% trader consensus against any ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027. These arrangements provide security guarantees that reduce incentives for independent arsenals, while technical, diplomatic, and alliance pressures create substantial barriers to rapid development or deployment. No major policy shifts, treaty withdrawals, or verified programs have emerged in recent months to alter this baseline. Late developments such as an abrupt alliance rupture, secret program disclosure, or sudden regional escalation could still shift probabilities, though such paths face high institutional and international hurdles.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volume
$212,517Data di fine
1 gen 2027Mercato aperto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETRisolutore
0x65070BE91...Strict non-proliferation norms under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, combined with US extended deterrence commitments to allies such as NATO members, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, underpin the 95.7% trader consensus against any ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027. These arrangements provide security guarantees that reduce incentives for independent arsenals, while technical, diplomatic, and alliance pressures create substantial barriers to rapid development or deployment. No major policy shifts, treaty withdrawals, or verified programs have emerged in recent months to alter this baseline. Late developments such as an abrupt alliance rupture, secret program disclosure, or sudden regional escalation could still shift probabilities, though such paths face high institutional and international hurdles.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato
Fai attenzione ai link esterni.
Fai attenzione ai link esterni.
Domande frequenti