**Iran has faced repeated parliamentary proposals and public statements threatening NPT withdrawal since the 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes on its nuclear facilities, yet no formal exit has occurred.** Lawmakers introduced urgent bills in March 2026 citing attacks on sites like Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan as justification under Article X, which allows withdrawal with 90 days’ notice upon declaring supreme national interests jeopardized. Iran has instead suspended most IAEA access and inspections (except at Bushehr), lost continuity of knowledge on its enriched uranium stockpile, and operated with sharply reduced safeguards cooperation, effectively achieving many practical benefits of non-membership without triggering full treaty exit. A June 2026 U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding reaffirmed Iran’s pledge against nuclear weapons, called for maintaining the nuclear status quo, and set a negotiating window, while an IAEA Board resolution in September 2026 referred Tehran to the UN Security Council for noncompliance—the first such step in two decades. Iranian officials have described withdrawal as a possible response to sanctions or pressure but have framed it as requiring thorough legal, security, and strategic review, with no consensus at the highest levels. The short remaining window before 2027, combined with diplomatic channels and the leverage of partial non-cooperation, underpins trader expectations that Iran will not complete the formal process in time.