**Traders assign only a 7.5% chance the United States will finalize a security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, reflecting stalled U.S.-mediated peace talks and the absence of a completed bilateral agreement.** Earlier progress in late 2025 and early 2026 produced draft commitments, including Article 5-like assurances and references to congressional ratification, alongside a January 2026 Paris Declaration outlining U.S.-led monitoring and post-ceasefire support. However, by mid-2026 senior U.S. officials described negotiations as unproductive, with no breakthrough on territory, Russian buy-in, or final terms. Recent months have seen continued but lower-level security assistance rather than new binding guarantees, and the tight remaining timeline makes Senate approval or formal conclusion before year-end improbable absent rapid diplomatic movement.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado8% chance
$36,272 Vol.
$36,272 Vol.
31 dez 2026
8% chance
$36,272 Vol.
$36,272 Vol.
31 dez 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders assign only a 7.5% chance the United States will finalize a security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, reflecting stalled U.S.-mediated peace talks and the absence of a completed bilateral agreement.** Earlier progress in late 2025 and early 2026 produced draft commitments, including Article 5-like assurances and references to congressional ratification, alongside a January 2026 Paris Declaration outlining U.S.-led monitoring and post-ceasefire support. However, by mid-2026 senior U.S. officials described negotiations as unproductive, with no breakthrough on territory, Russian buy-in, or final terms. Recent months have seen continued but lower-level security assistance rather than new binding guarantees, and the tight remaining timeline makes Senate approval or formal conclusion before year-end improbable absent rapid diplomatic movement.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado Aberto: May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
Volume
$36,272Data de Término
1 jan 2027Mercado Aberto
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders assign only a 7.5% chance the United States will finalize a security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, reflecting stalled U.S.-mediated peace talks and the absence of a completed bilateral agreement.** Earlier progress in late 2025 and early 2026 produced draft commitments, including Article 5-like assurances and references to congressional ratification, alongside a January 2026 Paris Declaration outlining U.S.-led monitoring and post-ceasefire support. However, by mid-2026 senior U.S. officials described negotiations as unproductive, with no breakthrough on territory, Russian buy-in, or final terms. Recent months have seen continued but lower-level security assistance rather than new binding guarantees, and the tight remaining timeline makes Senate approval or formal conclusion before year-end improbable absent rapid diplomatic movement.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$36,272Data de Término
1 jan 2027Mercado Aberto
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Traders assign only a 7.5% chance the United States will finalize a security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, reflecting stalled U.S.-mediated peace talks and the absence of a completed bilateral agreement.** Earlier progress in late 2025 and early 2026 produced draft commitments, including Article 5-like assurances and references to congressional ratification, alongside a January 2026 Paris Declaration outlining U.S.-led monitoring and post-ceasefire support. However, by mid-2026 senior U.S. officials described negotiations as unproductive, with no breakthrough on territory, Russian buy-in, or final terms. Recent months have seen continued but lower-level security assistance rather than new binding guarantees, and the tight remaining timeline makes Senate approval or formal conclusion before year-end improbable absent rapid diplomatic movement.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado
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