The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained power through 2026 despite acute economic contraction, nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and intermittent protests driven by shortages and U.S. sanctions, including an oil embargo and targeted measures. Security forces have contained demonstrations, including cacerolazos and localized unrest, while the military and party apparatus show no evident fractures. Official statements emphasize continuity, modest economic adjustments, and resistance to external pressure, consistent with the regime’s historical capacity to endure crises. Traders price an 89.5% probability against regime collapse this year because these institutional controls and elite cohesion outweigh the visible humanitarian strains, absent a decisive internal break or external intervention capable of triggering rapid change before year-end.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourLe régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Le régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Oui
11% chance
$1,677,031 Vol.
$1,677,031 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
Oui
11% chance
$1,677,031 Vol.
$1,677,031 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained power through 2026 despite acute economic contraction, nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and intermittent protests driven by shortages and U.S. sanctions, including an oil embargo and targeted measures. Security forces have contained demonstrations, including cacerolazos and localized unrest, while the military and party apparatus show no evident fractures. Official statements emphasize continuity, modest economic adjustments, and resistance to external pressure, consistent with the regime’s historical capacity to endure crises. Traders price an 89.5% probability against regime collapse this year because these institutional controls and elite cohesion outweigh the visible humanitarian strains, absent a decisive internal break or external intervention capable of triggering rapid change before year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volume
$1,677,031Date de fin
1 janv. 2027Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETRésolveur
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained power through 2026 despite acute economic contraction, nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and intermittent protests driven by shortages and U.S. sanctions, including an oil embargo and targeted measures. Security forces have contained demonstrations, including cacerolazos and localized unrest, while the military and party apparatus show no evident fractures. Official statements emphasize continuity, modest economic adjustments, and resistance to external pressure, consistent with the regime’s historical capacity to endure crises. Traders price an 89.5% probability against regime collapse this year because these institutional controls and elite cohesion outweigh the visible humanitarian strains, absent a decisive internal break or external intervention capable of triggering rapid change before year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$1,677,031Date de fin
1 janv. 2027Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETRésolveur
0x65070BE91...The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has sustained power through 2026 despite acute economic contraction, nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and intermittent protests driven by shortages and U.S. sanctions, including an oil embargo and targeted measures. Security forces have contained demonstrations, including cacerolazos and localized unrest, while the military and party apparatus show no evident fractures. Official statements emphasize continuity, modest economic adjustments, and resistance to external pressure, consistent with the regime’s historical capacity to endure crises. Traders price an 89.5% probability against regime collapse this year because these institutional controls and elite cohesion outweigh the visible humanitarian strains, absent a decisive internal break or external intervention capable of triggering rapid change before year-end.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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