**The high trader consensus against regime collapse before 2027 reflects the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience amid six months of U.S. and Israeli military strikes, intensified sanctions, naval blockades, and severe economic strain including rial depreciation and infrastructure damage.** The IRGC has expanded its influence over security and decision-making, enabling continued repression and the mobilization of large government-organized rallies, such as the September 2026 “Janfada-ye-Iran” event drawing hundreds of thousands in Tehran to signal support and readiness for defense. Fragmented opposition, absent unified leadership or transition plans, and the regime’s redundant command structures have limited the impact of earlier protests and elite strains. While economic hardship, succession uncertainty around the Khamenei family, and proxy network losses create ongoing vulnerabilities, these factors have not yet converged into the rapid institutional breakdown required for near-term overthrow.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · UpdatedWill the Iranian regime fall before 2027?
$26,213,187 Vol.
$26,213,187 Vol.
$26,213,187 Vol.
$26,213,187 Vol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...**The high trader consensus against regime collapse before 2027 reflects the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience amid six months of U.S. and Israeli military strikes, intensified sanctions, naval blockades, and severe economic strain including rial depreciation and infrastructure damage.** The IRGC has expanded its influence over security and decision-making, enabling continued repression and the mobilization of large government-organized rallies, such as the September 2026 “Janfada-ye-Iran” event drawing hundreds of thousands in Tehran to signal support and readiness for defense. Fragmented opposition, absent unified leadership or transition plans, and the regime’s redundant command structures have limited the impact of earlier protests and elite strains. While economic hardship, succession uncertainty around the Khamenei family, and proxy network losses create ongoing vulnerabilities, these factors have not yet converged into the rapid institutional breakdown required for near-term overthrow.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · Updated



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